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PREFATORY NOTE.
These oomments on British Philosophy of the Eighteenth Cen-
tury are largely the outcome of the work done in Professor Bode's
course hearing that name. The general standpoint of treatment was
developed in that course. The treatment of the subject naturally
does not pretend to he exhaustive or even to cover all the prin-
cipal points of doctrine. Its aim is simply to consider some of
the better-known passages and to show how they are not entirely
consistent with each other nor with the fundamental empirical. basis
of the authors.
May 27, 1910. J. E. M.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
Seldom indeed does the turn of a century happen to coincide
exactly with the beginning or the end of a great epoch of history,
either political, religious, or philosophical; and the period under
our consideration is no exception to the rule. That period of
British philosophy which is referred to in a general way as the
eighteenth century begins virtually in the year 1690 with the
publication of Locke's' famous Essay concerning the Human Understand-
ing and is brought to a close in 1785 with the appearance of Reid's
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.
The type of philosophy represented by Locke, Berkeley, Hume
and Reid is usually known as Empiricism, because their doctrine
is that the data of intelligence are all derived from experience.
Experience, however, is a very ambiguous word, and it is largely
due to conflicting interpretations of the connotation of the term
that we have the two-fold movement. What might be called the dom-
inant type of interpretation, since it forms the principal thesis
of all four of our philosophers, is the interpretation of exper-
ience known as Sensationalism. "Nihil in intellectu quod non
prius in sensu. "
Locke's statement of the problem may be taken as typical of
the whole group. "How comes (the mind) to be furnished?
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I
answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge
is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself."^ Such
is the presupposition of the whole group, but the strictness of
their interpretation, and the consistency with which they adhere to
it can oe shown only by a somewhat detailed analysis of some of
their fundamental doctrines.
(1) Essay, ii, li 2.

-1-
JOHN LOCXE.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
It is a very significant fact that while the leading phil-
osophers of Germany were men who breathed continually the air of
the universities, and who looked upon the problems of life from
the academic point of view, the leaders of English philosophic
thought were for the most part practical men of affairs; and of
no man was this more true than of John Looke. To this fact is to
be attributed many of the glaring inconsistencies of the Essay,
which was written in snatches during eighteen years of a busy
public life.
Locke himself tells us of the immediate occasion of the
Essay in his epistle to the reader. It appears that when he was
aoout the age of forty, five or six of his friends meeting in his
room and discoursing on a very remote from that of the human
understanding "found themselves quickly at a stand by the diffi-
culties that rose on every side." Locke continues: "After we
had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a solution
of these doubts which perplexed us, it oame into my thoughts
that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves on
inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own
abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, and were
not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who
all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should
be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a
subject I had never oefore considered, which I set down against >
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our next meeting , gave the first entrance into this discourse*
which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty;
written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect,
resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last,
in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure,
it was brought into that order thou now seest it."
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CHAPTER It.
IDEAS OF SENSATION: LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF SENSE-PERCEPTION.
Under the circumstances which attended the production of the
Essay we oan but expect to find inconsistencies, repetitions and
defects of arrangement; and when we also take into consideration
the fact that he had "never before considered" this subject, we
are not surprised to find in addition to the aforementioned defeots,
inconsistencies of doctrine. These are especially noticeable in
the doctrine of sense-perception, which it is our purpose to con-
sider in this chapter.
Locke's general doctrine of sensation is that "our Senses,
conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the
mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those
various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we
come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft,
hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible quali-
ties; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean,
they from external objects convey into the mind what produces
there those perceptions.
"
(
*
While the main tendency in the Essay with regard to sense-
perception is that known as the Copy Theory, in which it is main-
tained that some of our 'ideas' are copies of external things,
while others are not, ourselves being hemme'd in all the while to
the realm of ideas; we find here and there traces of a more
rudimentary view of sense-perception, namely, that the senses
directly lay hold on the external quality without t'he mediumship
of copies. We find various expressions of this view, e. g.,
Essay, ii, 1: 3.
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sensation "is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the
understanding by the senses.
"
(
' There is no standing room for
a 'copy' in this definition; the idea actually enters the under-
standing from the external world. The senses are the doorway
through which ideas enter; not a screen upon which their shadows
or copies are cast. Not only are simple ideas thus received,
but even such a complex idea as that of solidity enters by the
same portal. "The idea of solidity we receive by our touch; and
it arises from the resistence which we feel in body to the entrance
of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.
There is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation
than solidity If anyone asks me, what this solidity is,
(2)
I send him to his senses to inform him." This doctrine of direc
apprehension of the object serves Locke's purposes very well till
it encounters the variations in taste, color, sound, etc., which
it is powerless to expiain; Locke is thin driven to the conclusion
that "most of those (ideas) of sensation (are) in the mind no more
the likeness of something existing without us, than the names
that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon
(3)
hearing they are apt to excite in us." His argument for this
conclusion is as follows: "Flame is denominated hot and light;
snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas
they produce in us. Which qualities are commonly thought to be in
those bodies the same that those ideas are in us, the one the per-
fect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror, and it
would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say
otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire that
at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at a
(1) Essay, ii, 19; 1. (2) Essay, ii, 4: 1 & 6. (3) Essay, ii, 8: 7.
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nearer approach, produoe in us the far different sensation of pain,
ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say - that this
idea of warmth, whioh was produced in him by the fire, is actually
in the fire, and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in
him the same way, is not in the fire. Why are whiteness and cold-
ness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other
idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number,
and motion of its solid parts'?"^ Yet Locke maintains that "the
particular bulk, numoer, figure, and motion of the parts of fire
and snow are really in them, - whether anyone's senses perceive
them or no: and therefore they may be called real qualities, be-
(2)
cause they really exist in those oodles. " And as he later de-
clares that "it is evident the mind knows not things immediately,
„(3)
but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them" he
here definitely commits himself to the tender mercies of the Copy
Theory in connection with the so-called primary qualities, main-
taining that these are the "same in those bodies that their ideas
are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they
are in a mirror"^ while at the same time denying the resemblance
in the case of what he terms secondary qualities and powers. In
taking this position, Locke involves himself in two difficulties,
one in adopting the Copy Theory at all, and the other in applying
it in the case of 'primary' qualities while withholding it in the
case of 'secondary' qualities. We will consider these difficulties
in the order named.
The difficulty involved in Locke's Copy Theory is - How
are we to Know that the copy corresponds to the. archetype? On
Locke's basis this question is unanswerable, and he simply sidestep
(1) Essay, ii , 8: 16. (2) Essay, ii, 8: 17. (3) Essay, iv, 4: 3.

the problem by : reverting to his alternate doctrine of sense-percep-
tion as immediate apprehension of the external quality. Further-
more, how are we to know whether or no the sense-impression so
much as has an archetype? In the case of the 'primary' qualities
Locke maintains that it has, and in the case of the 'secondary'
qualities that it has not, but his proof of this statement is utter
ly inadequate. "A piece of manna of a sensible oulk is able to
produce in us the idea of a round or square figure; and by being
removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea
of motion represents it as it really is in the manna moving: a
circle or square are the same, whether in idea or existence, in the
mind or in the manna. And this, both motion and figure, are really
(1)
in the manna, whether we take notice of them or no. This is
really no argument at all, and is the only proof which Locke offers
for his doctrine. We simply have his word for it that "this every-
body is ready to agree to."*"^ But Berkeley was not ready to agree
to it, nor are we. The same argument that demonstrates the anti-
copy character of color, taste, and sound, serves likewise to re-
pudiate the doctrine of copyism for size, motion and figure. Do
the former vary with individuals, and from time to time with the
same individual? So do the latter. Berkeley's contention, that
extension, figure and motion abstracted from other qualities, are
inconcei vaole , is unanswerable. "I desire anyone to reflect and
try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the
extension and motion of a Dody withoutaall other sensible qualities
For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to
frame an idea of a oody extended and moving, but I must withal
give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged
U) Essay, ii , 8, 18.
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to exist only in the mind. in short, extension, figure, and motion
abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where
therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be
also."
(
^ To be sure, we do not paint our atoms and molecules
lurid reds and vivid greens, but the dull drabs or grays with which
we endow them are just as fatal to Locke's boundarjr line between
primary and secondary qualities. Furthermore, all our ideas of
extension, motion and figure are Just as full of reference to
human reaction and appreciation as are our ideas of color, taste,
and sound. Great and small, swift and slow, are as entirely
relative, changing with the variation of frame or position of the
organs of sense, as are hot and cold, sweet and bitter. Locke's
own illustrations are no exception to the rule. Is the size of the
flame any more constant as we approach it than the heat which we
feel from it? Does it not occupy more and more of the field of
vision?
Why, then, does Locke cling so tenaciously to his doctrine
of primary qualities? In the first place, being a plain man of
affairs and a pioneer in the field of theory of knowledge as well,
he seems not to have perceived that his criticism of the naive
realistic view of secondary qualities applied with equal validity
to primary qualities.
The primary qualities are those having a spatial character.
The others might be denied without abolishing our spatial world,
but to common-sense Loc»<:e, if the spatial qualities were denied
there would seem to be nothing 'tangible' left at all, and that
would never do. So by standing first on one foot and tnen on the
other, he is able to keep the semblance of the common-sense world
and is satisfied therewith.
(1) Berkeley, Principles, sec. 8.

CHAPTER III.
IDEAS OF REFLECTION.
We have found in our consideration of Locke's dootrine of
sense-perception that he vacillates between two views of what he
terms the 'idea of sensation', namely, the view that the object of
perception is directly and immediately apprehended, and the view
that it is known only through its copy. We find an analogous
bifurcation in his treatment of 'ideas of reflection.' The more
primitive view, and the one corresponding to the direct-apprehension
doctrine of sensation, is that the occurrence of a mental state is
identical with knowing it. "It is the first act of the mind,
when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas;
and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and there-
by also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another.
This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be
no Knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts
at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each
idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct
ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the other: and this it
does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by
its natural power of perception and distinct ion.
"
( ^ The attitude
taken in this view is very much like that of Spinoza in the propo-
sition: " If a man knows anything, he, by that very fact knows that
he Knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he
(2)
knows it, and so on to infinity."
A very different doctrine is presented in other passages, in
which we do not have an immediate intuition of our mental states,
(1) Essay, iv, 1: 4. (2) Spinoza: Ethics, Beok ii, prop. 21, Note.
"Simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit, se id scire, et
simul scit, se scire, quod scit et sic in infinitum." Cf. also
Ethics, Book ii, prop. 43.

-10-
but know them only after they have occurred. As we can thus con-
template them only when pasty it is obvious that we must do so by
means of some sort of copy of them, hence this doctrine corres-
ponds to the Copy Theory in sense-perception. "Though he that con-
templates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and
clear ideas of them; yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way,
and consider them attentive ly, he will no more have clear and dis-
tinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may
be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of
any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not
turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it.
The picture or clock may be so placed, that they may come in his
way every day; out yet he will have out a confused idea of all the
parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention,
to consider them each in particular. And hence we see the reason
why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the oper-
ations of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or
perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives.
"
(
"The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters
from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and ob-
serves its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence
other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contem-
(2)
plation as any of those it received from foreign things." "The
mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea,
(3)
and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it. In these
passages is related the second theory of reflection; but just what
does the mind do when it 'turns its view inward upon itself, and
observes its own actions about those ideas it has'? Locke nowhere
explicitly tells us. By the 'operations of the mind' does he mean
(1) Essay, ii, 1: 7, 8. (2) Ibid., ii, 6: 1. (3) Ibid., ii, 10: 7
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merely a shuffling and rearranging of its contents, as does Hume
in his philosophy, or does it involve something more; and in the
latter event, what else is it that is involved? Upon strictly
empirical grounds the former connotation is all that can be allowed
him, and Locke not only submits to this connotation with good
grace, out in the chapter on Complex Ideas, he quite definitely
maintains that shuffling and rearranging of simple ideas is exactly
what constitutes complex ideas. It would be difficult indeed to
state this more clearly than Locke himself does in these words.-
"As the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple
ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its
simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the
others are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its
power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: (1) Combining
several simple ideas into one compound one; (2)... Bringing
two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them
by one another ,.. . without uniting them into one; (3)... Sep-
arating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their
real existence: All that man can do is either to unite them
CI)
together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.'
Locke here insists that all the operations of the mind can accom-
plish is a mechanical rearrangement of its ideas. Yet if thus
restricted he could not have established his doctrines of causation
and substance, to say nothing of the other respects in which his
philosophy would have suffered.
Locke takes for granted that the second "fountain from
which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the
(2)
perception of the operations of our own minds." Since he re-
gards it as a self-evident fact, we will let him have it for what
(1) Essay, ii, 12: 1. (2) Ibid., ii, 1: 4.
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it is worth, and simply as* what he means by it. One interpreta-
tion is to be found in the passage aoove quoted from the
chapter
on Complex Ideas, in which we have an active mind, whose activity
is confined, however, to a mere rearrangement of its materials.
Hume's statement of the process eliminates the mind altogether.
The perceptions, being independent entities, do the shuffling
themselves, or rather just are shuffled. Nowhere in the Essay,
however, is Locke so rigorous in his logic as to take this extreme
position. In the position he does assume we find quite an ambiguity
in the statement of what the mind observes. Does it observe merely
the passive 'being-shuffled', or its own active ' doing-the-shuf f 1 ing
as well? The former is all that Locke's statement of the process
warrants, and yet he must have the latter, too, to make good his
case
.
It is just because Locke allows himself at his convenience
to vary the connotation of such terms as 'operations of the mind'
and 'perception' of those operations that his doctrine is at once
so plausible and so hollow. By playing fast and loosejwith his
terminology Locice seems to disguise the dilemma even from himself;
out the equivocation is there none the less.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE DEFINITION OF TRUTH.
In Book IV Locke comes to the crux of his problem. The
ideas with which he has been concerned in Books II and III are now
to be transformed into Knowledge. The process of this transfor-
mation Locke at first defines as one of combining these ideas
according to their "connection and agreement or disagreement and
repugnancy'/ 1
)
However in the statement of the kinds of agreement
and disagreement which LocKe at once makes, namely, identity or
diversity, relation, co-existence, and real existence, he intro-
duces in the last category a kind of agreement and disagreement
which cannot be subsumed under the general statement. For the agree
ment or disagreement of 'actual real existence' is the agreement or
disagreement, not of ideas with one another, but with things "with-
out the mind." . To be sure, Locke has said that he will use the
(3)
term 'idea' as meaning either "perceptions in our minds" or
(4) (5)
"qualities in the objects. " But, as Green observes, this
confession of the equivocation does not prevent its consequences,
which are nothing less than the entire web of difficulties in
which LocKe is later entangled.
We have then to consider these two definitions of truth. To
get them more clearly before us I shall quote at some length from
the Essay. The following passages argue for the general statement
that truth consists in the agreement or disagreement of ideas with
each other as they are in the mind. "Since the mind, in all its
thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own
ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that
our knowledge is only conversant about them. Knowledge then seems
(1) Essay, iv, U 2. (1) Essay, iv, 1: 7. (2) Essay, ii, 8: 7.
(4) Essay, ii, 8: 8.
(5) Green: General Introduction to Hume's Treatise, sec. 18.
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to me to oe nothing but the perception of the connexion of and
agreement , or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In
this alone it consists." "When we pronounce concerning gold,
that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more
out this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire uncon-
sumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that
particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, mal ieableness
,
and solubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea signified
by the word 'gold'."
(2)
"The different clearness of our knowledge
seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has
M (5)
of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas." "Wherever
we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas,
„(4)
there is certain knowledge."
That Locke champions a sort of agreement and disagreement
that cannot be brought under the general statement is obvious from
the following extracts from the Essay: "If our knowledge of our
ideas terminate in them, and reach no further, where there is some-
thing further intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little
more use than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built
thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees
things clearly in a dream, and with great assurance utters them.
But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident that this way
of certainty, by the Knowledge of our ideas, goes a little further
than bare imagination: and I believe it will appear that all the
certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else. It is
evident the mind Knows not things immediately, but only by the
intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore,
is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas
and the reality of things. But what shall oe here the criterion?
(1) Essay, iv, It 1, 2. (2) Ibid., iv, li 6. (5) Ibid., iv, 2: 1.
(4) Ibid., iv, 4, 18.
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How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas,
know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems
not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be ideas that
we may be assured agree with things."
We have brought out in these passages two opposing defini- .
tions of knowledge, and their relation to each other; and upon them
turns the whole of the fourth book of the Essay. We see how Locke
starts with the conception that truth is the agreement or disagree-
ment of ideas with each other, is driven to the other conclusion,
then is forced back again to the first, and ultimately emerges with
what is practically an eternal division of territory between the
two conceptions, though each continues to deny the other.
Taking the definition of truth with which Locke begins the
oook, namely, - the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one
another, let us inquire just what is meant by this expression. It
does not seem, at first blush, to be a very illuminating definition
Locke illustrates it as fol lows : "When we know that white is not
black, what do we else out perceive, that these two ideas do not
agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the
demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two reght ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two
right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from,
(2)
the three angles of a triangle?"
In our examination of this passage, let us bear in mind
LocKe's doctrine of judgment. I use 'judgment' net in the re-
stricted sense in which he uses the term, but in the more usual
meaning in which every affirmation or negation, certain or probable
is designated judgment. According to Locke every such judgment
involves two ideas. Consequently, if in this passage, disagreement
means only that the idea 'white' is not the idea 'black', out
(1) Essay, iv, 4: 2, 3. (2) Ibid., iv, 1: 2.
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siraply that they are two different ideas, then every possible
judgment would have to express this much and this kind of disagree-
ment, or oe mere tautology
.
( 1
)
Even the triangle judgment, given
oy Locke as an example of agreement, has in it this much disagree-
ment: for unless the ideas 'triangle' and 'two right angles' are
different ideas, there would be no judgment at all. Apparently,
then, this is not what Locke meant, for it does not get us beyond
tautology.
An examination of Locke's definition of truth from a stand-
point suggested by the first illustration, that of perception, does
not prove much more illuminating. A perception of 'white' may be
said to agree with another such perception, and to disagree with
one of 'black' in some intelligible sense, but this fact is not at
all helpful in attacking the problem of knowledge. Perceptions are
just what they appear to be. It is in their immediate content that
we are interested. The word 'truth' has significance only when
that which is immediately present is symbolic or representative
of something else. In the white-black example there is no judg-
ment, no belief, involved; hence it sheds no light on our problem.
Really, Locke had no right to either of these illustrations, for
as just shown, one of them is an example of immediate perception,
and not of judgment, whereas the other is in the field of mathemat-
ics, which, as will appear later, Locke claims to be a special
kind of knowing, not bound down by the same laws as ordinary facts.
What, then, does Locke's definition of knowledge mean? It
seems to be a very crude way of defining knowledge as 'belief
based on evidence', but without giving any criterion for belief,
or the least inkling as to what constitutes sufficient evidence.
The uncritical character of this definition is responsible for the
(1) See quotation on p. 9. "The mind perceives all
distinct ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the other."
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vacillation of Loc^e between the two kinds of agreement.
In the first place, Locke's general statement of the def-
inition hems him in to the narrow circle of his own ideas. That
Locke himself realizes this is evident in the conclusion which he
is not long in reaching, that this sort of agreement , (except in the
supposed case of mathematical and moral judgments, which we will
consider later,) yields only trifling knowledge. It is very 'cer-
tain' knowledge, to be sure, but it is as useless as it is certain.
All judgments about substances (and these are the judgments which,
says LocKe, 'have most to do with the affairs of life') must consist
not simply of a reference of ideas to each other, but of a reference
to 'real existence', to 'things.' "All gold is malleable
is a very certain proposition, if mal leableness be a part of the
complex idea the word gold stands for. But then here is nothing
affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea in which
malleaoleness is contained: and such a sort of truth and certainty
as this it is, to say a centaur is four- footed.
"
(
1
* "It will oe
altogether as true a proposition to say ill centaurs are animals,
as that all men are animalsj and the certainty of one as great as
the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together
according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and the agree-
ment of tne idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and
visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with
that of man* and so each of these two propositions are equally true,
(2)
equally certain." This is true enough, but these are all analy-
tic propositions, as Kant would say. If this were the only kind
of judgment we could form, we would cry out with Locxe, "But of
(2)
what use is all such truth to us?"
Having never distinguished between the analytic and the syn-
thetic judgment, in answer to his own question Locke is forced to
(1) Essay, lv, 6, 9. (2) Ibid., iv, 5: 7.
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his second definition of truth which is as follows: "Wherever we
are sure ... ideas agree with the reality of things, there is cer-
tain real knowledge." Although our idea of 'reality' is the
most important of all our ideas, Locke says little about its nature
|
and origin. What do we predicate of a subject when we predicate
real existence of it? What is the precise connotation of the term
'really existing thing'? These are questions which Locke does not
touch upon.
It is not my aim to point out all the inconsistencies and
difficulties in which Locke is involved by his second definition
of truth. Some of them are the same as those involved in the
Copy Theory of Sense-Perception. (Cf. pp. 6-8.) My present pur-
pose is sufficiently accomplished, if I succeed in pointing out
some of the problems involved in this time-honored definition of
truth as the correspondence between the idea and its object. By
this definition, an idea, to oe true, must have an object. But
what constitutes the relation known as 'having an object'? When
is an object the object of any givon idea? In the second place,
the idea must correspond, or as Locke says, agree with its object.
But what is the relation called correspondence or agreement? How
much must an idea resemble its object in order to be true? A
photograph resembles the person whom it portrays: must an idea be
a sort of photograph of its object? Here our problem is the same
as in the doctrine of sense-perception in which LocKe made some
perceptions photograph their objects and others not. On the other
hand, may an idea oe very unlike an object, and still be a true
idea thereof? Are not the figures in the ledger utterly unlike
the transactions which they are employed to represent? And yet
may they not be true? The character and degree of agreement
between idea and ideate which Locke intends when he talks about
(1) Essay, iv, 4: 18.
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•the truth of an idea' or 'real knowledge' is a doubtful matter.
As to the other problem it seems plain that an idea can have an
object without rightly corresponding to it. For how else would
error be possible? To have an object, and to correspond to it are
therefore different relations. What then is the character of the
relation which makes a given idea have a given object, whether it
properly agrees with that object or not? These are problems which
are readily suggested by Locke's theory of knowledge, but which he
nowhere attempts to solve. Here, as elsewhere, his system is val-
uable, not for its positive contribution to philosophy, but because
he. raises problems which are vital issues at the present day, and
furnishes an excellent point of departure in the consideration of
these problems.
We found, (on p. 16.) that Locke made special claims for our
Knowledge of mathematics and formal ethics, but deferred consid-
eration of this topic, and will now examine more particularly
Locke's doctrine in this connection. "All the discourses of the
mathematicians about the squaring of a circle, conic sections, or
any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any
of those figures: but their demonstrations, which depend on their
ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle exist-
ing in the world or no. In the same manner, the truth and certain-
ty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men, and the
existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat: nor
are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the
world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pat-
tern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed
nowhere when he writ but in idea. If it be true in speculation,
i. e. in idea, that murder deserves death, it will also oe true in
i;
reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder.
(1) Essay, iv, 4 S 8.
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While this is not the only passage in which Locke expresses this
preposterous doctrine, it is renresentat i ve of them all. It
would seem that the very example which he employs would be suffic-
ient to show him that murder 'in idea' means nothing morally.
Let us define murder as the intentional killing of one human being
oy another. Now what is the significance of 'deserve' and of
'death' in pure speculation? How can we tell by abstract specula-
tion that to Kill a fellow being intentionally does not confer a
great blessing and merit a great reward? The very terms 'murder',
'deserve', ana 'intention' have their significance because of their
application in the world of fact and not simply in the world of
speculative theory; it is because of their actual existence that
they can be speculated upon, and even then only in so far as they
have a definite reference to things real. The same is true of
mathematics, as the simplest instance will suffice to show. In
mathematics we are concerned with quantity. For our illustration
let us take the number two. What possibly can this number mean
without any reference to actual real existence? Mathematics is
not a different kind of knowing from that of ordinary experience,
out like all the other sciences, is a generalization based ultimate-
ly on sense-experience. The terms in the relation 2 plus 2 equals
4 or of any other mathematical relation are meaningless except as
they are capable of sensuous verification, either directly or
indirect ly.
The fact which seems to have led Locke astray at this point
is one whicn has led many others as well to conclude that in math-
ematics we have a different Kind of knowledge; namely, the fact that
in mathematics we cannot possibly imagine an exception to the gen-
eral law, whereas in physics, we can imagine bodies gravitating
(1) Other places are - Essay, iii, 11: 16 ; iv, 3: 18-20; iv, 4: 7.
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upwards, in chemistry we can imagine water ignited upon the appli-
cation of a lighted match, etc., etc. Instead of critically ana-
lyzing this difference Detween mathematics and ordinary knowledge
to ascertain its nature and cause, Locke seems to regard it as
a difference in Kindj whereas the difference is really due to the
fact that an imagined exception in this field is a real exception.
Mathematics deals with quantity, and imagined quantity, being just
as capaDle of being measured and counted, and consequently as real
for the purposes of mathematics as any other, must submit to its
laws: but this does not render it independent of sensuous exper-
ience, nor change its qualitative character, though it does give
it a pre-eminence over the other sciences in the extent of its
scope. Mathematics and abstract morality have then for criteria
of their validity the same sort of standards as any other sort of
knowledge
.
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CHAPTER V»
THE LOCK IAN DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE
.
When Locke approaohes the problem of the nature of substance
we find that he maxes a radical departure from the
preliminary and
fundamental empirical principles upon which he had proposed to
work out his theory of Knowledge. Here, in the main,
he takes his
stand upon rationalistic ground. For, according to him, the
idea
of substance is not derived from sensation and reflection, as
simple ideas are derived. His account of the origin of the 'com-
plex ideas of substances' is as follows: "The mind being, as I
have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas,
conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things,
or oy reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that
a
certain number of these simple ideas go constantly
together;
which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited
to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick
dispatch, are
called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvert-
ency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple
idea, which indeed in a complication of many ideas together: be-
cause, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can
subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose
some
substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result,
which therefore we call substance .
"
( 1}
In this passage, our apt-
ness to consider a complication of simple ideas, which we notice
to go constantly together, as one simple idea, is accounted
for as
the result of a presumption that they belong to one thing.
That
it is pure presumption is brought out in the following passage in
these words: "If any one will examine himself concerning his notion
of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of
it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of
( 1) Essay, ii, 23: 1.
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suoh qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us;
which qualities are commonly called accidents The idea then
we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing
but the supposed, out unknown, support of those qualities we find
existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without
( 1
)
something to support them, we call that support substantia. " In
still another connection we are told that "the idea of substance
„(2)
we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection.
Unsophisticated common-sense ordinarily shifts between two
contradictory doctrines of substance; namely, first, that the sub-
stance consists in and of the qualities of the object; and second,
that the substance has these qualities but is not identical with
them. Although Locke confesses that the former doctrine is all
that
experience substantiates, that "colour, ... weight, ... fusibility,
fixedness, ... ductility and solubility in aqua reaia, ...
these, or parts of these, put together, usually make the^complex
idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call gold,"
~ he seems
to feel that such a doctrine is inadequate to account for perma-
nence through change, as for instance the identity of gold in solid
and molten condition. So he gladly seizes on the scholastic doc-
trine of a je ne scat quoi standing behind the qualities and sup-
porting them, without realizing, apparently, that this doctrine
not only fails to offer a satisfactory solution for the difficulties
of the first doctrine, but furthermore involves its adherent in
yet other difficulties. Here Locke's sophistication gets him into
trouble, and the abandonment of his empirical principles fails to
relieve the situation. Nor is this the only particular in which
LocKe abandons his empirical tenets in the doctrine of substance,
for he also in this case makes the general idea precede the par-
ticular,
(4)
which is against the whole tenor of his doctrine of
(1) Essay, ii, 23: 2. (2) Ibid., i, 3: 19. (3) Ioid., ii, 51: 9.
(4) Ibid., ii. 23: 3.
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aostraction as an operation whereby "the mind makes the particular
ideas, received from particular objects, to become general."
In his doctrine of substance Locke lays himself open to three
searching criticisms.
I. - In adopting his definition of substance as the "support
of those qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist
(2)
without something to support them" we have the substance 'support-
ing' the qualities: in calling it the 'substratum' wherein the quali-
ties do subsist, we have them 'inhering' is the substance. Now
whether we look at the problem from the side of substance or the
side of quality, we have 'support' or 'inherence' both of which
are terms expressing a spatial relation. Now as our hypothetical
suostance is by definition out of space, since extension, position,
and other spatial attrioutes are qualities quite as much as color
and taste, the terms 'support' and 'inherence' are metaphorical,
are unintelligible as an analogy and do not help us a whit in our
conception of the relation between substance and quality. Further-
more, why may not the qualities inhere in each other just as well as
in the suppositious substance?
II. - A second objection to our hypothetical substance is
that it fails to accomplish another end for which it was invented;
namely, to account for change. For by definition it is not only
non-spatial, but non-temporal as well, time relations being quali-
ties just as properly as those of space. Being, then, out of time,
it can neither itself change, nor account for change.
III. - Lastly, being out of space and time, it cannot become
(3) m
known by us. Locke himself refers to it as "unknown." Then if
we cannot know it, and it fails to explain that for which it was
postulated, why assume it at all?
We find traces of the more' naive and empirical doctrine of
(1) Essay, ii, 11> 19. (2) Ibid., ii, 2| 2. (3) Ibid., ii, 23: 2.
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substance in the Essay, but they are swallowed up in the other.
For instance we read "It is the ordinary qualities observable in
iron or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of i
I
those substances, which a smith or jeweller commonly knows better
than a philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of,
has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a
collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them'.'
If Locke had taken his stand here, he would have remained true to
his empirical principles, but we find him going on to say: "Only we
must take notice that our complex ideas of substances, besides all
those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused
idea of something to which they belong and in which they subsist,"
and LocKe insists with considerable uniformity upon this further
consideration. Hence our statement at the beginning of this chapter
that Locke's most radical departure from empiricism is to be found
in his doctrine of substance.
(1) Essay, ii, 23: 3. (2) Ibid., ii, 23: 3.
i J
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CHAPTER VI.
The Doctrine of Causation.
The oonoeption of causation is notable among Loose's
cruoial instances, testing the sufficiency of 'experience' to
explain the highest conceptions. This is among the most crucial,
for it is under this category that the spatial and temporal uni-
verse is conceived as a unity. He seems to feel his duty as an
empiricist to find it in experience. In his chapter on Cause
and Effect he says that "in the notice that our
senses take of
the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that
several particular both qualities and substances begin to exist;
and that they receive their existence from the due application
and operation of some other being. From this observation we get
our ideas of cause and effect."
(1)
Locke maintains that we are
sensuously made cognizant of this 'application and operation.'
Let us consider his own example. "Thus finding that in that
substance which we call wax fluidity, which is a simple idea
that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the applica-
tion of a certain degree of heat, we call the simple
idea of
heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluid-
( 2
)
ity the effect." Locke nowhere explains why we do so, except
in so far as he refers it to a 'constant' custom of our finite
experience. Nor does he indicate how a limited experience can
oblige us to predioate universality in the future to the causal
connection. But no finite number of instances observed by an
individual, or even by all mankind, can justify the inference of
(1).. Essay, ii, 26, 1 (2), Essay, ii, 26, 1
II OA 111
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universal necessity. Consequently Locke has failed to derive our
belief in universal causation from our custom of observing ohanges
in external objects.
Let us then turn to his subjective derivation of the idea',
he points here to sel f -consciousness as the root of the belief in
oauses. "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from
reflection on what passes in ourselves) where we find by experience,
that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we
can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest."
But here no more than in the other instance do we have any rational
grounds for attributing universality in the future to the causal
nexus. The fact that in connection with my will to move my arm
just now, my arm moved, is not in itself, nor are any finite num-
ber of such occurrences, sufficient to account for my belief in a
like connection tomorrow.
So it is no great cause of astonishment to find Locke
elsewhere aoandoning empirical grounds and asserting boldly with
the rationalists that our knowledge of causation is innate. In
his first letter to Sti 1 lingf leet he writes, that "everything that
has a beginning must hate a cause is a true principle of reason
which we come to Know by perceiving that the idea of beginning to
be is necessarily connected with the idea of some operation; and
the idea of operation with something oparating which we call a
cause." A similar statement is made in the Essay t "Man knows by
an intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any
real being, than it can be equal to two right angles
( 1 ) . Essay, ii , 21 y 4.
DilJioqo •oa lo nBbi 9<it boJoonr.oo Yiii*seoooii ti M
•o rfeirt* ;.r.i:»T#^o ,<nl Jecofc dtlv aol?*?oqo lo *ofcl #4$
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If therefore we know there is some real being, and that nonentity
cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration,
,(,1
that ... what had a beginning must be produced by something else.
Here we have Locko's two antagonistic theories of our
belief in the causal principle, and they illustrate as prettily
as any one doctrine, tne twofold movement in his philosophy, for
he nowhere attempts to reconcile them, nor even acknowledges their
contradiction of each other.
(1) Essay, iv, 10: 3.

GEORGE BERKELEY.
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CHAPTES 1
.
INTRODUCTION.
There is a very olose connection between Locke and Berkeley.
While still a student at Trinity College, Berkeley came under the
influence of the Essay and we find that his philosophy is based on
the same empirical presuppositions, subject, however, to a more
rigorous logic. In the Commonplace Book, written at the age of
twenty-four, we find his empirical position voiced in no
uncertain
tone: "Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perceptions
and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the
mind We must with the mob place certainty in the senses."
In the opening paragraph of the Principles of Human Under-
standing, Berkeley lays down his fundamental principles, which are
substantially a restatement of Loctce's fundamental position. He
says: "It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects
of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually
imprinted
on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the
passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by
help of memory and imagination - either compounding, dividing, or
barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid
ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their
several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft,
heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more or less
either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours,
the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in
all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these
are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by
one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example,
a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been
observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signi^
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fied by the name apple, other collections of ideas constitute a
stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things - which as
they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love,
hatred, joy, grief, and so forth."
Thus Berkeley starts with the same fundamental assumption as
Lookt, namely, that the elemental unit of all our knowledge is
the particular concrete sense-experience. He represents an ad- .
vance over Locke, however, in that he insists that this is the ulti^
mate datum, whereas Locke tried to go behind this, and maintained
that there was some external non-ideal object corresponding to
the idea in the mind. Locke had taught that real bodies are without
color, sound or odor: that they are merely masses of colorless,
extended, solid, moving particles which in us produce two sorts of
ideas; first, ideas resembling or copying these qualities, namely,
the 'primary' ideas of extension, solidity and motion; and secondly,
ideas utterly unlike any qualities of the object, namely, the 'sec-
ondary' ideas of color, sound, odor, etc.
Berkeley's point of departure from Locke is this distinction
between qualities and ideas. He takes issue with Locke chiefly
by teaching that primary qualities as well as secondary are purely
ideal. We shall not here concern ourselves with a critical esti-
mate of this doctrine as a whole, but will proceed immediately to
that portion of it which involves the most glaring two-fold move-
ment; and that is with regard to what constitutes the objective
fact corresponding to our perception.
(1) Principles, sec. 1
1 Bit ' :
-32-
CHAPTER II.
BERKELEY'S DOUBLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE
FACT CORRESPONDING TO OUR PERCEPTION?"
In the second dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, we find
Hylas, the opponent of Berkeleianism, arguing for the existence of
'matter' in this wise: "I find myself affected with various ideas,
whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of
themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by them-
selves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings.
They have therefore some cause distinct from me and them: of which
I pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas.F (1)
And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter." With the prem-
ises Berkeley agrees, but the conclusion he denies since matter is
conceded to be an "unthinking, inactive Substance": then, demands
Berkeley, "how oan that which is inactive be a cause; or that which
(2)
is unthinking be a cause of thought? 11 Making Berkeley a present
of his contention, for his proof is not conclusive, let us examine
his own doctrine of the cause of our ideas. This is perhaps best
stated in the Principles of Human Knowledge: "Whatever power I may
have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by
Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad day-
light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I
shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall pre-
sent themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and
other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my
will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces
( 3
)
them." In this passage it is maintained that the objective fact
corresponding to our perception is a divine act. But let us con-
sider some of the implications of this doctrine. When God affects
the mind, there is perception; otherwise there is nothing. This
(1) Works, Fraser ed.
, 1871, vol. i, p. 308. (2) Ibid., p. 309.
(3) Principles, sec. 29.
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doctrine makes no difference between actual perception and dream
experience. But surely there is a difference between a real dollar
and an imagined dollar. Yet, if, as Berkeley here teaches, real
dollar and tde dollar of our dreams follow from the same act of God,
there is no room left for the experienced distinction.
Now Berkeley realized as clearly as anyone the weight of
this charge of destroying the distinction between real and unreal.
He maintains that 'there is a rerun natura, and the distinction
oetween realities and chimeras retains its full force." But he
cannot ma^e good this distinction on the basis of this doctrine of
perception, and we find him partially retracting even before he
finally abandons the doctrine for another. "The ideas imprinted on
the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things: and
those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and
constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things,
( 2)
which they copy and represent." These latter ideas, then, are
not the result of a divine act. Even so, a further charge may be
preferred against this theory of perception, which is so cogent that
Berkeley is finally forced to substitute another theory for it.
This objection is "that from the foregoing principles it follows
things are every moment annihilated and created anew." His
rejoinder to this objection is "If we consider it, the objection
proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the
principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection
at ali to our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of
sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceivedj
yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence e xcept only
while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit
that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said
(1) Principles, sec. 34. (2) Ibid., sec. 33. (3) Ibid., sec. 45.
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to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood
to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It
does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies
are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all dur-
ing the intervals between our perception of them."
( J
Thus by a
sort of metaphysical sleight-of-hand, Berkeley substitutes an en-
tirely different doctrine of the objective fact corresponding to
our perception. It is no longer a divine act but an idea in some
other mind, especially the divine mind, as appears in the third
dialogue between Hylas and Philonous: "When I deny sensible things
an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular,
but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to
my mindj since I find them oy experience to oe independent of it.
There is therefore, some other mind wherein they exist, during the
intervals between the times of my perceiving then: as likewise
they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihila-
tion. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite
spirits, it necessarily follows there is an omnipre sent eternal
Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to
( 2)
our view." Let us now inquire as to how he exhibits them to our
view. Obviously we must be either immediately aware of these per-
ceptions in the divine mind, or be furnished with copies of them.
We have exactly the same alternatives as did Locke in his theory
of perception and no more.
Let us first examine Berkeley's conception of knowledge as
the copy of something, for as was the case with Locke, we find him
holding to both theories. In the first place, according to this
theory we can have no idea of spirit, as is brought out in the fol-
(3)lowing bit of dialogue.
Hvl. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert
(1) Principles, sec. 48. (2) Works, vol.1, p. 325,
(3) Ibid., pp. 326, 326.
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beings? Or have they any agency included in them?
Phil. They are altogether passive and inert,
ffyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?
Phil. I acknowledge it.
Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the
nature of God?
Phil. It cannot I own I have properly no idea,
either of God or any other spirit? for these being active, cannot
be represented oy things perfectly inert, as our ideas are.
Berkeley therefore had recourse to the doctrine that one
may have 'notions', though not ideas, of spirit. But in another
connection he admits that notions are passive in exactly the same
senie as are ideas, and thus a notion of spirit is as inherently
impossible as an idea of spirit. "All our ideas, sensations,
QQUQQS, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever
names they
may oe distinguished, are visibly inactive - there is nothing of
power or agency included in them."
This is prooably the most serious flaw in Berkeley's doc-
trine: for on his own showing he has no right to the knowledge of
his own existence, upon which his whole system depends. In
order
to reach his conclusions it is therefore necessary
to abandon this
theory of knowledge, at least insofar as one's own
spirit is con-
cerned, and to admit that it at least is known directly, without
the interposition of ideas.
This alternate conception of knowledge as direct and not mere
copy encounters an insurmountaole obstacle which renders
it unten-
able upon Berkeley's doctrine of our relation to other 'selves'
both God and our fellow finite spirits. I shall digress here just
enough to sketch oriefly this doctrine and shall then show how it
is irreconcilable with this alternative theory of knowledge. Ber-
keley's conception of the interrelation of spirits is never clearly
( l ) Principles, sec . 25.
vine*
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outlined, out the implication is one of externality. God, for
instance, is radically distinct from us, a God outside us, not
organically related to us as is the 'Oversoul' or 'Transcendental
Ego' of modern idealism. Likewise in the case of other limited
spirits, "it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other
spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them
excited in us."
(1)
With this conception of the relation of myself
to other selves, the character and number of other selves are not
matters of direct knowledge, but of inference. The difficulty in
this conception is: Kow, if a self is other-than- I , am I directly
and certainly to know it, since what gives my consciousness of my-
self its peculiar validity is the fact that it is myself, and no
other of whom I am conscious?
This theory, as well as the other, must be abandoned, for on
neither one is a knowledge of spirit, at least spirit other-than-I
,
possible; and the solipsism which is the logical outcome would no
more prove satisfactory to Berkeley than to anyone else.
One very radical departure from his empirical foundation is
to be found in connection with Berkeley's doctrine of causation.
We find the empirical position presented quite strongly in this
passage: "The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and
feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed -
meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or
that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an
odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was
heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch."
Let us proceed with the figure. There was a cause, that is, it
was — what? Hume with a more rigorous logic fails to find any
sense-perception of causality such as Berkeley produces for smell,
taste, color, figure, etc., and challenges the world to produce one
(1) Principles, sec. 145. (2) Ibid., sec. 3.
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so far as I can learn, it is yet to be produced.
This very uncritical assumption is at the very root of the
first examined theory of knowledge, namely, that our perceptions
are caused by an act of God* And is alao involved in the second
theory, so when it is undermined, the whole superstructure totters
and falls. Whence does Berkeley derive this notion of causation
with which his whole philosophy is so intimately bound up. It
cannot be from the external world. He tells us expressly that there
is no causation there. "When we perceive certain ideas of Sense
constantly followed by other ideas, and we know this is not of our
own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas
themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing
can, pe more absurd and unintelligible . Thus, for example, having
observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous
figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation
called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the oause
of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision
of Dodies to oe attended with sound, we are inclined to think the
(1)
latter the effect of the former." As this is an 'absurd and un-
intel ligiole' notion, it is certain that Berkeley does not get his
idea of causation thence. He seems to derive it from a consider-
ation of the activity of the mind. I find I can excite ideas in my
mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think
fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea
arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and
makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very
properly denominate the mind active." Such is Berkley's ana-
lysis of the psychology of ideation. From this, modern psycholo-
gists differ greatly, as is instanced by this passage from Miss
Calkins: "In what sense, one may ask, do I create ideas? Is there
(1) Principles, sec. 32. (2) Ibid., sec. 28.
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any trace in my experience of that 'making out of nothing' in which
creation is supposed to consist? I call myself creative in certain
moments of imagination and thought. But what do I actually ex-
perience in thinking out a mathematical demonstration, or in strik-
ing out the plot of a story? I turn my mind toward the general
topic of my interest; I regard the topic stedfastly from all sidesi
idea after idea dawns upon me, and - of a sudden - there
arrives
on the that particular idea which I recognize as the solution of my
problem or the satisfaction of my aesthetic impulse. Berkeley
would say that I create the idea, yet it certainly is also true
that I did not mase it, that it merely appears suddenly here
within my consciousness."
Such a creation or causation as this is not what Berkeley
in endeavoring to prove for God, and as it is all we can discover
in the workings of our own mind, we must conclude that he does not
derive it from this source. As all possible sources have oeen
exhausted, both the inner and the outer reality failing to yield
the coveted causal principle, we must conclude that Berkeley's
use of it is an assumption unwarranted by his own fundamental
principles.
(1) Miss Calkins: Persistent Problems, pp. 143, 144.
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CHAPTER III.
THE LATER TREND TOWARD RATIONALISM.
The idealism of Berkeley's later life, as contained in the
essay entitled Siris, his famous 'tar-water treatise', shows a de-
cided drift away from the professed empirical basis of his early
philosophy, which considered the world simply a congeries of
sense-impressions, towards a recognition and re-instatement of
the constructive powers of the intellect. In fact, portions of
this essay may be said to foreshadow the spirit, if not the letter,
of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The mind is given a more cen-
tral place than in the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Dia-
logues. "He recognizes a process of rationalizing our knowledge
which transcends tne emoirical oasis of the Principles. This dis-
tinction oetween sense and intellect and their several offices and
functions is one which emerges in this later phase of his ideal-
ism, and is characteristic of a growing appreciation of the inad-
equacy of his earlier posit ion.
"
( 1
}
This distinction between Sense
and Intellect is stated uuite explicitly in the following passage
in the Siris: "Sense at first besets and overbears tne mind. The
sensiole appearances are ail in all; our reasonings are employed
aoout them: we look no farther for realities or causes; till intel-
lect begins to dawn, and cast a ray on this shadowy scene. We
then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and existence.
Those things that oefore seemed to constitute the whole of Bein?,
upon taking an intellectual view of tilings, wrove to be but fleet-
ing phantoms. From the outward form of gross masses which occupy
the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine the inward
structure and minute parts, and, from observing the motions in
nature, to discover the laws of those motions. By the way he
(1) Hiooen: The Philosophy of Enlightenment, p. 80.
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frames his hypotheses and suits his language to this natural phil-
osophy. And these fit the occasion and answer the end of a maker
of experiments or mechanic, who means only to apply the powers of
nature, and reduce the phaenmoena to rules. But if, proceeding
still in his analysis and inquiry, he ascends from the sensiole into
the intellectual world, and Peholds things in a new light and a new
order, he would then change his system, and perceive that what he
tooK for substances and causes are but fleeting shadows: that the
mind contains all, and acts all, and is to all created beings the
source of unity and identity, harmony and order, existence and sta-
bility.
This office of the intellect is remarkably similar to that
of the Kantian categories. Indeed, there are some passages in the
Siris wnich read like passages from the Critique of Pure Reason
itself, notaoly the following: "As understanding perceiveth not,
that is, doth not hear, or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not:
and although the mind may use both sense and fancy, as means where-
oy to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul so far forth as sen-
( 2)
sitive, Knoweth nothing." Compare with this a passage from the
Critique: "Witnout sensioiiity no object would be given to us,
without understanding none would oe thought. Thoughts without
content are empty, perceptions without conceptions are blind....
(3)
Understanding can perceive nothing, the senses can think nothing."
In the last quoted passage from the Siris, taken with the last
clause of the one quoted just previously, Berkeley, with Xant,
appeirs to say: 'Upon tne raw material of sensation the mind brings
to pear its organizing and constructive activity, ordering all
things according to the laws of its own nature. The mind is never
(1) Siris, sections 294, 295. (2) Ibid., section 305.
(3) Kritix der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed.
,
p. 75. (Watson, p. 41.)
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passive, but is actively creative in every sense-perception, how-
ever simple and elemental it may seem to be. A merely receptive
experience, therefore, may not be regarded as the oeginning of
knowlege, for experience is nothing without the thought which ren-
ders it intelligible.'
It is a far cry from the early conviction of the Commonplace
Book: that "mind is a conieries of percept ions"
( 1
}
to Berkeley's
last word in philosophy that "sense or soul, so far forth as sen-
sitive, icnoweth nothing."; but we cannot conclude that in tne
latter he anticipated the Kantian theory of knowledge for the simple
reason that he never seems to have fully appreciated the signi-
ficance of his later philosophy and its utter inconsistency with the
empirical foundation of his earlier idealism. Had he fully ap-
reciated the significance of the argument of the Siois, he would
have felt the need of modifying his initial presuppositions and of
correlationg them with this later development. But this, unfor-
tunately, Berkeley never attempted, so what might otherwise have
been considered a remarKabie contribution to philosophy and a de-
cided anticipation of Immanuel Kant, must be regarded rather as
an inconsistent departure from his avowed empirical principles. It
is enough for us here to recognize the fact that Berkeley's phil-
osophy may oe developed in two different ways. He seems to have
seen the inevitable consequences of mere Lockianism, and in con-
sequence, whether consciously or unconsciously, to have shifted
his ground, introducing into knowledge other elements besides
bald sense data, which legitimated to his own satisfaction his
constructive theory of the universe. But these other elements
which are introduced do not simply add to our ways of knowing!
they effect a revolutionary transformation of its character, so
(1) Commonplace Book, p. 27. (2) Siris, sec. 305. Cf also sec. 253

that if Berkeley had followed up this new departure, he would
prooaDly have given thern the office of the Kantian categories and
have identified oeing and knowing. At least we may say that this
is the direction of his movement. Thus knowledge would lose its
representative character and possess an immediacy which it could
not have on the old Lockian foundation. But inasmuch as those
elements were left undeveloped by Berkeley in his influential
wotksj (for the Siris seems to have been without influence upon
philosophical thought, at least until recent years, when it 'has
reaped the fruit of Professor Fraser's loving care'); and inas-
much as the necessity of their introduction was not convincingly
worked out, they appear, therefore, rather as unauthorized assump-
tions - incongruous patches upon the unrepudiated faoric of Locr-
ian principles.

DAVID HUME.

CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
In the philosophy of David Hume we cannot help but recog-
nise the logical development of Berkeley *s youthful metaphyeios.
It was brought out in the last chapter that it was possible for
Berkley's philosophy to be developed in either of two directions,
one of which he himself took in the Siris* but as he did so at the
cost of an ittDlioit repudiation of his basal empiricism, it is not
surprising that Hume, ignoring these new and fragmentary oonstruct
ive suggestions, should carry further that negative criticism of
Locke, which commended itself to his passionless intelleot. With
Berkeley's individual philosophy he was not deeply concerned, but
he was deeply interested in deducing the ultimate consequences of
generally accepted philosophical principles.
These ultimate consequences are his doctrine of causation
and his doctrine of perception, into which we shall not go in de-
tail, but shall briefly state, as our interests in this paper are
chiefly concerned, not with these doctrines themselves, but with
his inconsistent lapses from their legitimate 6on3equenoes into
rational assumptions utterly untenable upon the basis of the doc-
trines which he with muoh labor defends.
We shall first consider his doctrine of perception. "All
the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves," says Hume,
"into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEaS.
The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and
liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their
way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which
enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions t and
under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emo-
tions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas
I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning} such
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Mi Wt ,*#Z0tf lqat> iiim sin 10 nc ( J Alt<f e«f i loi ld*l tlM 16 1*00
•*10i*lTO •<i*J*«a 1*11 IbJtllUlr.f.'MJQ ciuOlM « *H0* 1M <ttuft •*
I
* .lObftUlflJ MtiMiMM t*4 •# U#*li fceua«»*#oc OSlrfW
i , c#oi#onoo yict*b lofl 8ii v.. ,.iu.eoii.ia 4Ji>blvlb«J •*
••9A«L«p*tiico •iMillu enj juloubtb at btfttitlai
>ifi»n*o to •atiloob lift- bib »ertitijf'#taeo ilMillu bcim? 41
1«- luii , a**l**i*ftl »«alilO0b b*bfll rili» lob ,bbfti»oaob v. iitiMo
Itti **on»uD#»no<5 •iMiltji*! ilbiM haott tttcbi : ifltl*lftbobftl~4fttf
b lb tltbb bbl nodti tI4jA*#Ai) Y^blly ' inolltiuttb I jaolUi
U**o
-45-
as, for instanoe, are all the oerceotions excited by the present
disoourse, excepting only those whioh arise from the sight and
touch, and exoeotin the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may
occasion
.
This statement di so loses the fact that Hume recognizes two
and only two kinds of perceptions, which he says are 'distinct'
and of which he offers two criteria for distinguishing them,
namely: (1) Impressions have more force and liveliness than ideas,
and (2) they occur prior to ideas. This latter criterion suggests
still a third difference, whioh is given later in the section:
"Ail our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriu'd from,
simple impressions , which are correspondent to them, and which
they exactly represent
"The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is
a convincing proof, that the one are the oauses of the other; and
this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our im-
• (2)
pressions are the causes of our ideas." So muoh for an outline
of Hume's doctrine of sense-perception. How consistent he is in
maintaining it will appear later.
The other particular in whioh Hume departed radically from
his predecessors is the doctrine of causation. Never before had
the relation been subjected to critical scrutiny. Descartes and
Locks, and even Berkeley had assumed without discussion the prin-
cipal of causae connection. Hume's chief interest in the 'relation
of Cause and Effect' is due to the fact that "by means of that
relation alone we can go Deyond the evidence of our memory and
( 3
)
senses." When Hume proceeds to 'anatomize' this relation, he
finds it to consist of a customary oonj unction of events wnioh
involves a "determinat ion of the mind ... to carry our thoughts
(1> Treatise,!, 1: 1 . ( Seloy-Bigge ed., p. 1. Green & Grose ed.,p.311
(2) Ibid., S.-B., pp. 4 & 5, G.& G. , p. 314.
(3) Enquiry, (Open Court ed., p. 24.
"i lt«1»Jfli If
•di lo miii va" jgf! 9f\$ ©I
n« .lo.-ev ido lo •ontbtvt I
olflv aiaovt lo fiolionuLnoo ii«oi
-46-
from one object to another.
"
(1)
He has no place in his system for
the necessity ordinarily predicated of the causal relation. Of
this he says: "After a frequent repetition, I find that upon the
the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by
custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a
stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object.
'Tis this impression, then, or determination, whioh affords me tne
( 2)
idea of necessity." "Necessity is nothing but that determina-
tion of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects
' (3)
to causes, according to their experienc'd union."
It is not our purpose in this connection to examine Hume's
positive doctrine as to what causality really is, but simply to
point out that uoon his presupposition that isolated sense-impres-
sions and their copies, and nothing more, constitute the elements
of our exoerience, it is impossible to find a place for causation.
It "evidently follows from our fundamental principle, that all
(4)
ideas are copy'd from impressions." In the supposed case of
causality "we only find, that the one (event) does actually, in
fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is atten-
(5)
ded with motion in the second." As this exhausts the content of
the impression, the idea of oausality can have no further meaning
than customary conjunction; it can never mean necessary connection.
Lapses from tnis conception will be indicated in later chapters.
(1) Treatise, i, 3: 14, S.-B., p. 165, G.&G., p. 459.
(2) Ioid., S.-B., p. 156, G.& G . , pp. 450, 451.
(3) iDid., S.-B., p. 166, G.& G., p. 460.
(4) Ibid., S.-B., p. 163, G.& G., p. 458.
(5) Enquiry, (Open Court ed. ) p. 64.
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CHAPTER 1 1
.
THE EXTERNAL WORLD.
Hume's doctrine of the external world is very easily stated.
The suostanoe of it is that there isn't any. What he understands
oy the term 'external world' is a "universe whioh depends not on
our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible crea-
ture were aosent or annihilated.
"
(
1
) Such a world, says Hume,
cannot oe known either through the senses or by reason. He re-
quests us to "oDserve a few of those experiments, which convince us
that our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence.
When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all
oojects to Decome douoie But we do not attribute ... exist-
to ooth these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature,
we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are deoendent on our
organs, and the disoosition of our nerves and animal spirits.
This opinion is confirm 'd by the seeming encrease and diminution
of oDjects, according to their distance; by the apparent altera*-
tions in tneir figure;... from all of which we learn, that our sen
sible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or indeoendent
„(2)
existence
.
Another line of argument of wnich Hume makes use is that
employed by Berkeley to show that primary and secondary qualities
are on the same footing, and as the latter admittedly have no
external independent existence, neither do the former. The conclu
sion of this argument is tnus stated: "Upon the whole, then, we
may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all percep-
(3)
tions are the same in the manner of their existence." Finally
he adjures us to asoertain by introspection that "nothing can
(1) Enquiry, p. 160.
(2) Treatise, i, 4: 2, S.-B., p. 210, G.& G . , p. 498, cf£nq. , p. 160
(5) I Did., S.-B., p. 193, G.& G., p. 483, of. Enquiry, p. 164.
-.uc en
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ever be present to the mind but an image or perception
and no man who reflects," he adds, "ever doubted that the existen-
ces which we consider, when we say this house and that tree are
nothing but perceptions in the mind. "Philosophy informs us
that every thing, which aooears to the mind, is nothing but a
„(2)
perception,... and dependent on the mind.
The senses then cannot provide us with an external universe;
no more, says Hume, can reason. "Even after we distinguish our
perceptions from our oDjects,... we are still incapable of reason-
ing from the existence of one to that of the other? So that upon
the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever
shou'd, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd
(3)
and distinct existence of body." "The only existences, of which
we are certain, are perceptions The only conclusion we can
draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by
means of tne relation of cause and effect. But as no beings
are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we
may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect be-
tween different perceptions, but can never observe it between per-
ceptions and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the
existence ... of the former, we can ever form any conclusion
" (4)
concerning the existence of the latter." Granting Hume's con-
ception of causality as a mental relation, there is no escape from
this argument. But in this passage is implied a more fundamental
argument which is not dependent upon the validity of his doctrine
of causation. It is this? Objects inferred are none the less ob-
jects of consciousness, hence present to the mind. If present to
the mind they cannot be independent of it. Therefore it is im-
( 1) Enquiry, p. 161
.
(2) Treatise, i,4: 2, S.-B., p. 193, G.& G . , p. 483.
(3) Ibid., same page. (4) Ibid., S.-B., p. 212, G.& G. , po.499, 500.
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possible to infer reality which is independent of mind, and it is
sel f -contradict ion to say that it can be done.
Notwithstanding the strength of this position of Hume, we
find him implying on almost every page that objects do exist in-
dependently of the mind. The fundamental difference between
impression and idea is that the former are occasioned by the stim-
ulation of the organs of sense through external oojects. This
distinction surely loses its significance if sense organs and ex-
ternal oojects are themselves simply perceptions of the mind. In
many other places as well, Hume implies the independent existence
of matter which he ultimately rejects. In the paragraph quoted
above in which Hume asserts that "nothing can ever be present to
the mind but an image or perceotion" he defines perceptions to
oe "copies or representations of other existences, which remain
uniform and i ndependent .
"
*
1
^ Here conflicting statements are found
within tne same sentence. In another connection he remarks that
"'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty
obvious of itself, tnat nothing is ever really present with the
mind but its perceptions, or impressions and ideas, and that ex-
ternal objects become Known to us only by those perceptions they
occasion." A sentence such as tnis is pretty sure to be mis-
leading when used by a writer who holds that "the opinion of
(3)
external existence ... is contrary to reason."
In quite a different connection Hume caters to the popular
belief and seems in entire accord with it. "External objects ....
require a continu'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great
measure the regularity of their operation. I am seated here in
my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the oojects, that
striKe my senses, are contain'd in a few yards around me. My
(1) Enquiry, p. 161. (3) Enquiry, p. 165.
(2) Treatise, 1, 2: 6, S.-B., p. 67, G.& G . , p. 371.
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memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects* but
then this information extends not beyond their past existence, nor
do either my senses or memory give me any testimony to the continu-
ance of their oeing. When, therefore, I am thus seated, and re-
volve over these thoughts, I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door
turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who ad-
vances towards me. This gives occasion to many new reflections
and reasonings. First, I never have observ'd, that this noise
cou'd proceed from anything but the motion of a door; and there-
fore conclude, that the present phaenomenon is a contradiction to
all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on t'other
siae the chamber, be still in oeing.. Again, I have always found,
that a human oody was possest of a quality, which I call gravity,
and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must
have done to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I rememoer
oe not annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive
a letter, which upon ot-ening it I perceive oy the hand-writing
and suoscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two
hundred leagues distant. "lis evident I can never account for this
phaenomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances,
without spreading out in my mind the whole sea and continent be-
tween us, and supposing the effects and continu'd existence of
posts and ferries, according to my memory and observation. To
consider these phaenomena of the porter and letter in a certain
light, they are contradictions to common experience, and may be
regarded as objections to those maxims, which we form concerning
the connexions of causes and effects. I am accus-tom'd to hear
such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time.
I have not received in this particular instance both these percep-
tions. These ooservations are contrary, unless I suppose that the ,
door still remains, and that it was open'd without my perceiving
is ton tl tit iur .9on«e
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it; And this supposition, which was at first entirely arbitrary
and hypothetical, acquires a force and evidence by its being the
only one, upon which I can reconcile these contradictions. There
is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar
instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to suppose the
continu'd existence of objects, in order to connect their past and
present appearances, and give them such an union with each other
as I have found by experience to oe suitable to their particular
natures and circumstances. Here then I am naturally led to regard
the world, as something real and duraole, and as preserving its
existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception.
Here, certainly, unperceived events are postulated, and they
cannot be referred to the Berkeleian divine mind, for, as we shall
see presently, Hume has no place in his system for such a mind. Yet
he is ooliged to fill in these unperceived events in order to main-
tain his doctrine of causation, though he has no place to put them.
Here is a dilemma indeed, his doctrine of perception precluding
the existence of unperceived events, and his doctrine of causation
demanding them. For to Hume causation means invariable sequence,
and sequence is anything but invariable, in fact is usually the
exception, unless unperceived events are postulated. A very few
examples will suffice to show this. We believe that light and heat
are causally connected. Yet how often do we find them associated
in our experience? We have seen many a fire without feeling any
heat, and we have warmed ourselves at many a stove without seeing
the flame; in fact our experiences of the two together are far
outnumbered by our experiences of them separately. Hume himself
enumerates examples of this in the quotation above. The unseen
stairs are postulated to account for the porter's mounting to his
(1) Treatise, i, 4: 2, S.-B., pp. 195-197, G.& G . , pp. 485, 4S6.
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1
room. Posts and ferries are postulated to account for the trans-
mission of the letter. The creaking sound is referred to the mo-
tion of the door upon its hinges, though the door itself is outside
|
the range of vision, etc. Thus we find Hume obliged to postulate
the very thing he denies in order to give his doctrine any plaus-
iuility at all.
In another passage it is brought out quite clearly that Hume
is guilty of a further inconsistency which some metaphysicians,
even of today, v. g., Pearson and Strong, have not succeeded in
avoiding, namely - the assumption of a physical percipient organ-
ism to prove that there is no physical body of any sort* Hume's
statement of this inconsistency is: "An object that presses upon
any of our nje.fflb.eis., meets with resistance; and that resistance, oy
the motion it gives to the n§rve.s and an.ima.1 &p.UUs, conveys a
sensation to the mind."
(1)
Yet the conclusion to which this leads
is "that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd
and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities
there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence?
Hume's argument is so convincing because of his apparent
concurrence with the everyday belief in supposedly 'real' external
things, and when the reader sees that Hume doesn't believe in the
existence of these 'real' things, confidence in Hume's integrity is
shaken, for it looks very much like trying to gain the benefit of
popular convictions, which properly oppose his doctrines.
However, although this bid for popular favor brings to light
the fact that the distinction between impression and idea falls with
the elimination of external things, it does not invalidate Hume's
contention against a non-ideal reality which rests upon at least
one argument (cf. p. 48, bottom) independent of his impression-
idea theory ox knowledge.
- »
(1) Treatise, i, 4: 4, S.-B., p. 230, Q.& G . , p. 515.
(2) Ibid., S.-B., p. 231, G.& G . , p. 516.
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CHAPTER III.
THE SELF.
Thus far Hume's metaphysical doctrine parallels Berkeley's
idealistic conception of the world in that it is a negation of
non-ideal reality. To be sure he has greatly reinforced the argu-
ment at several points. But his chief claim to originality lies
in his doctrine that the universe is non-spiritual as well; that
it consists simply of 'perceptions' unattached to any spiritual,
percipient self.
We will now consider his reasons for denying the existence
of selves. By self he means that which is conscious, which is es-
sential to its perceptions, and which retains its identity in the
flux of ideas which it has. His arguments to prove such a self
non-existent are fundamentally two: first he argues that a self
need not exist, on the ground that our own perceptions, existing
independently, have no need for a subject to which to be referred;
his second argument that a self does not exist is based on the
ground tnat our supposed self-consciousness is merely a conscious-
ness of perceptions and not of an identical self at all. We will
now consider these two arguments at some length.
The best argument, says Hume, which philosophers have to
offer for the existence of a self, is that there must be some
"material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our per-
ceptions to inhere. But "what" asks Hume, "(do) they mean by
suostance and inhesion? As every idea is deriv'd from a
precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds,
we must also have an imoression of it; which is very difficult, if
not impossible, to be conceiv'd. For how can an impression repre-
sent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? And how can an
impression resemble a substance, since, according to this philosoph'3
(1) Treatise, i, 4: 5, S.-B., p. 232, G.& G
. , p. 517.
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it is not a substance and has none of the peculiar qualities or
characteristics of a suostance?
"If instead of answering these questions, anyone shou'd
evade the difficulty, I shou'd observe, that whatever is clearly
conceived may exist, This is one princiole which has already
oeen acknowledg ' d. Again, every thing, which is different, is
distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is sep-
araole This is another principle. My conclusion from both
is, that since all our perceptions are different from each other,
and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct
and separable, and may oe consider'd as separately existenty and
may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support
their existence. M< • This argument is not so far reaching as the
second which Hume orings to Dear against the Self, as at most it
only proves that from the existence of ideas we are not obliged to
infer the existence of a self in which they inhere.
The second argument is that if there were an I , I would be
conscious of the fact. "Some philosophers," he says, "imagine we
are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF;
that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and
are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its
perfect identity and simplicity Unluckily," he adds, "all
these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience,
which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the
(2)
manner it is here e^plain'd."
As for himself, he says: "When I enter most intimately into
what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception
or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain
or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a per-
(1) Treatise, i, 4: 5, S.-8., pp. 232, 253, G.& G . , po. 517, 518.
(2) Treatise, i, 4: 6, S.-B., p. 251, G.<£ G
. ,
p. 533.

oeption, and never can ooserve anything but the perception. When
my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so
long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.
And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither
think:, nor feel, nor see, nor love , nor hate after the dissolu-
tion of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive
what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If
any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a
different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer
with him. All I can allow him is, that he may oe in the right as
well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular.
He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he
ii
calls himself i though I am certain there is no such principle in me.
He then concludes that "mankind ... are nothing put a oundle or
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a peroetual flux and move-
ment The mind is a Kind of theatre, where several percep-
tions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide
away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations...
There is no simplicity,... nor identity The comparison of the
theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions
(2)
only that constitute the mind." In another passage he says:
"We may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap
or collection of different perceptions, united together oy certain
relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect
(3)
simplicity and identity."
These, then, are Hume's arguments against the existence of the self.
Yet in spite of his denial of its existence, he presupposes its
existence on almost every page. For instance, while on one page we
(1) Treatise, i, 4: 6, 3.-B., p. 252, G.& G
. ,
p. 534.
(2) Ioid., S.-B., pp. 252, 253, G.& G . , p. 534.
(3) Ioid., i, 4: 2, S.-B., p. 207, G.& G., p. 495.

-56-
read that the "mind is nothing out a heap or collection of differ-
ent perceptions", and on the very next we are told that "the mind
falls so easily from one perception to the other, that it scarce
perceives the change. He tells us of 'operations of the mind',
which he amplifies in another place oy saying that "the mind has
the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and
( 2)
vary them as it oleases." But how can a bundle of fleeting
perceptions separate, unite, and mix ideas? This inconsistency
comes out quite prominently if we substitute for Hume's personal
pronouns, his definition thereof. Thus the passage quoted on page
54, (oottom of page) "When I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I always stumole on some particular perception, etc."
oecomes "When a heap of perceptions enters most intimately into
what it calls a heap of perceptions, it always stumoles upon some
particular perception, etc." The passage isn't nearly so convinc-
ing wnen thus roooed of the implication of the self it professes
to deny.
In his argument against what he calls "the confusion and
(3)
mistake" of "the notion of identity" Hume's explanation assumes
the e<istence of the very thing his argument denies, namely -
a continuous self. In the first place, he admits that we have a
"great ... propension ... to suppose ourselves possest of an
(4)
invariable and uninterrupted existence" which, while calling
it a delusion, he explains as oeing due to the ready "transition
of the mind from one object to another, ... theusmooth and unin-
terrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas"
But this smooth and easy transition implies the very continuous
mind against which the argument is directed. Thus we see that the
(1) Treatise, i, 4: 2, S.-B., pp. 208, 209, G.& 3., pp. 495, 496.
(2) iDid., Appendix, S.-B., pp. 623, 624, G.i Q . , p. 555.
(3) Ioid., i, 4: 6, S.-B., p. 254, G.& G . , p. 535.
(4) Ibid., i, 4: 6, 3.-3., p. 253, G.& G., p. 535.
(5) Ibid.. S.-B.. pp. 254, 260, G.& G., pp. 555. 541.
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implication of a self is not a mere unessential excrescence of
Hume's doctrine, but is vital and fundamental to his doctrine of
personal identity. The same is true of his definition of causa-
tion as being 'a determination of the mind'. But no mind, no de-
termination. Fleeting perceptions can 'pass, re-pass, and glide
away' out it is folly to speak of them in a way which involves a
degree of oermanence, which according to Hume, they do not possess.
Thus it is evident that Hume's argument against the exist-
ence of the self, since it presupposes a continuous mind, is like
the similar argument against body in general which presupposes
a sentient, or as Hume would say, a percipient, organism. Hence
it refutes itself and is inconsequential. It will be rememoered
that in the case of his negation of body or matter Hume had a more
fundamental proof, which did not rest upon the prestidigitation
which characterizes the two arguments just considered, and which
alone was capable of supporting his negation of non-ideal, non-
spiritual reality. He has no homologous argument in his assault
upon the self, so we must decide that his proof is inadequate,
and that he has not made out a case. Nevertheless he has shown
that the character of this self cannot be 'substantial' in the
Ber.<eleian sense, for the inhesion of perceptions in a substantial
mind is as incomprehensible as the inhesion of qualities in a
substantial body. The organization and identity of the Self must
do of a different type than this. Thus. far, I believe, Hume's
argument against the self is conclusive.
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THOMAS RSID.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
However unsatisfactory and inconsistent we may find Hume's
scepticism to oe as a permanent philosophy, yet it is very signifi-
cant to one seeking to appreciate and understand the progressive
movement in British philosophy of the eighteenth century. By
furnishing conclusive evidence that the Lockian account of the
sources of Knowledge and the processes of its development lead
inevitacly to a position of unqualified skepticism, Hume incites in
the Inquiring mind a desire to seex a more profound and truer
oasis for the foundations of our Knowledge.
This was precisely the effect which Hume's philosophy pro-
duced in the mind of his countryman, Thomas Reid. Originally, Reid
had Deen a follower of Locxe and Berkeley, but by a study of the
Treatise, he had been arousea, like Kant, from his dogmatic slum-
oer, and made to realize the disintegrating character of the
Locxian presuppositions. In his principal work, the Inquiry into
the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Reid gives an
account of the influence which Hume exerted upon his point of view.
According to Reid, Hume's analysis, in revealing the weak-
ness and inadequacy of Locke's position, is a reductio ad absurdum
of his principles, and consequently oalls for a serious and careful
re-examination of the ground upon which they rest. He asserts that
Locxe's explanation of the 'original of human knowledge' is not true
to e<perience, and that consequently on purely empirical grounds
it will not pass muster. Hence the system founded thereupon,
which Reid calls the ideal skepticism, "is a rope of sand, and all
the laboured arguments of the sceptical philosophy against a mater-
ial world, and against the existence of everything but impressions
( 1
)
and ideas, proceed upon a false hypothesis."
(1) Inquiry, c. 5, sec. 7, (Works, Hamilton ed., 1863, p. 128.)
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CHAPTER II.
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.
Reid's philosophy has Peen much neglected, partly because of
the appearance a little later of Immanuel (ant, whose system out-
shone that of his Scottish oontemporary , and partly because his
fondness of opposing the vulgar to the tribe of ohilosophers -
to 'all philosophers, ancient and modern', as he says on one occa-
sion - has led people to suppose his philosophy to be an unrea-
soned protest against the ideal system, an unanalyzed and somewhat
gross assertion of the dual existence of mind and matter and of the
immediate presence of the one to the other. And it is true, that
notwithstanding his maintenance of a theory of immediate perception
in his zeal against subjective idealism, he has over-stated his
case and maintained the independence of the material world in terms
which imply the old two-substance doctrine: and that doctrine, as
we saw in Locxe, necessitates the theory of Representative Percep-
tion or Copy Theory wnich leads straight through to Hume, whose
system Reid attempts to combat.
Let us then oriefly notice the conflict Detween Reid's
statement of the doctrine of Immediate Perception, and his analy-
sis of it. In his analysis of the original concrete experience,
Reid concludes, and rightly, too, that the elemental experience is
not . ure sensation, out judgment, where the term 'judgment' does
not imply an articulate expression of the content of the exper-
ience, but simply that it has, oesides the bald sensation, meaning,
that it is, in modern terminology, a perception. To quote Reid?
""The ideal system ... teaches us that the first operation of the
mind aoout its ideas, is simple apprehension - that is, the oare
conception of a thing without any oelief about it: and that, after
we have got simple apprehensions, by comparing them together, we
perceive agreements or disagreements between them; and that this
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perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is all that
we call belief, judgment, or knowledge. Now this appears to me to
be all fiction, without any foundation in nature; for it is acknowl-
edged Dy all that sensation must go before memory and imagination;
and hence it necessarily follows, that apprehension accompanied
with belief and Knowledge, must go before simple apprehension,
at least in the matters we are now speaking of. So that here,
instead of saying that oelief or Knowledge is got by putting to-
gether and comparing the simple apprehensions, we ought rather to
say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and ana-
lyzing a natural and original j udgment .
"
(
*
*
Thus far, 1 doubt not, modern psychology and philosophy
would agree entirely with Reid, that in adult life, at least,
perception is immediate. But in holding the view that perception
is in some way a copy of outer reality, Reid gets into difficulty.
In order to understand Reid's doctrine, we must know the meaning
of the word 'suggestion', which is an important one in his philoso-
phy. He borrows the term from Berkeley, but gives it a somewhat
different aoplication. He uses it to denote those 'judgments of
nature' which are implied in the existence of things, relations
which are essential to the constitution of our experience, yet
which cannot oe said to be given in sensation as such, but only
alorjg with the data of sense proper. After having "considered, ...
Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Hardness, Roughness, as well as
Colour, Heat and Cold, Sound, Taste, and Smell," he says, "We
have endeavoured to show that our nature and constitution lead us
to conceive these as qualities of body, as all mankind have always
conceived them to be. We have likewise examined with great atten-
tion the various sensations we have by means of the five senses,
and are not able to find among them all one single image of oody,
or of any of its qualities. From whence, then, come those images
(1) Inquiry, o. 2, sec. 4, Wotks, pp. 106, 107.
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of body and of its qualities into the mind? Let philosophers re-
solve this question. All I can say is, that they oorae not by the
senses. I am sure that, by proper attention and care, I may know
my sensations, and be aole to affirm with certainty what they re-
semble, and what they do not resemole. I have examined them one
dv one. and compared them with matter and its qualities; and 1
,,(1)
cannot find one of them that confesses a resembling feature.
How, then, do we come to predicate the qualities Reid here enum-
erates, of bodies, if, as he says, our sensations from them do not
copy them? Here is where 'suggestion' comes in. "Although colour
is really a quality of body, yet it is not represented to the mind
oy an idea or sensation that resembles itj on the contrary it is sug
gested by an idea which does not in the least resemble it. And
this inference is applicable, not to colour only, but to all the
(2)
qualities of oody which we have examined." Here we have Reid's
analysis of the relation between sensation and percection in a
nut-shell. That which bridges the gap between matter and mind,
namely - sensation, does not in the least resemole that which it
represents. In the mind, however, it provokes an instantaneous
reaction, a sort of oacK-stroKe, the perception, which does re-
semble the quality of the body to which it is referred. This is
Drought out strikingly in the case of our Derception of hardness
and softness: "oy which words we always understand real prooerties
or qualities of bodies of which we have a distinct conception.
"When the parts of a body adhere so firmly that it cannot
easily be made to change its figure, we call it hard; when its
parts are easily displaced, we call it soft. This is the notion
which all mankind have of hardness and softness; they are neither
sensations, nor like any sensation; they were real qualities be-
fore they were perceived by touch; and continue to be so when
they are not perceived
(1) Inquiry, c. fi, sec. 6, Wotks, pp. 140, 141. (2) Ibid., p. 140.
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"There is, no douot, a sensation by which we perceive a
body to oe hard and soft. This sensation of hardness may easily
oe had, Dy pressing one's hand against the table, and attending
to the feeling that ensues, setting aside, as much as possible,
all thought of the taole and its qualities, or of any external
thing (The) sensation which we have every time we feel a
body hard ... hath not the least similitude ... to ... that
quality of bodies which we call hardness . "
( '
"Extension ... seems to be a quality suggested to us by the
very same sensations which suggest the other qualities named above.
(Hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, figure and motion-
When I grasp a ball in my hand, I perceive it at once hard, figured
and extended. The feeling is very simple, and hath not the least
resemblance to any quality of body. Yet it suggests to us three
primary qualities perfectly distinct from one another, as well as
from the sensation which indicates them. When I move my hand along
the table, the feeling is so simple that I find it difficult to
distinguish it into things of different natures; yet, it immediately
suggests hardness, smoothness, extension, and motion - things of
very different natures, and all of them as distinctly understood as
(2)
the feeling which suggests them.
"Let a man ress his hand against the table - he feels it
hard He hath a certain feeling of touch from which he con-
cludes, without any reasoning, or comparing ideas, that there is
something external really existing, whose parts stick so firmly
together, that they cannot be displaced without considerable force.
The hardness of the table is the conclusion, the feeling
is the medium oy which we are led to that conclusion (They
are) as unlike as any two things in nature. The one is a sensation
j
(2) Inquiry, c. 5, sec. o, Works, p. 125. 1
( D Ibid., c. 5, sec. 2, Wor^s, pp. 119, 120.
VfllJ
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of the mind, which can have no existence but in a sentient being;
nor can it e<ist one moment longer than it is felt; the other is
in tne taole, and we conclude without any difficulty, that it was
in the taole oefore it was felt, and continues after the feeling
is over
"And as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness, so
neither can our reason perceive the least tie or connection be-
tween them But ... all mankind are led by their constitu-
(1)
tion to conclude hardness from this feeling."
We have now examined enough examples of the relation be-
tween sensation and perception to oe able to understand what Reid's
doctrine of the relation is, for he says that the same is true
of 'all the qualities of oody which we have examined.' Let us now
ascertain its defects and antagonism to his avowed principle of
immediate perception.
We find Copyism at the bottom of his difficulties just as
in the case of the ideal system to which he was opposed. Although
he discovers that sensations are devoid of resemblance to external
reality he feels that perceptions must be. 'We have a distinct
of real qualities or properties of bodies', and our conception of
the uuality copies the quality itself as is quite obvious from
the aoove quoted passages. At bo ttom his 'Natural Realism'
oresupDosed the same duality as did the theory of 'Representative
Perception', and he was obliged in consequence to postulate some
sort of copyism for the perception for it to be true to the thing
perceived. This fallacy was inevitable under the older realism.
The newer realism has escaped it by acknowledging the instrumental
character of percept and judgment. Reid's renunciation of copyism
beinz only so far as bald sensations are concerned, was not
»
(1) Inquiry, c. 5, sec. 5, Works, p. 125.
ni *Jieoe*
-65-
thorough-going enough, to deliver him from the snare of representa-
tionalism. His instincts seem to have led him in the right direc-
tion, but he tried to lay hold of the doctrine of immediate percep-
tion without entirely letting go of representational ism, and in
trying 'to serve two masters' succeeded only in defeating his
own ourpose.

-66-
CONCLUSION.
Our conclusion from this study of eighteenth century phil-
osophy is mainly negative, but even thus it is far from worthless.
It is said that after Edison had performed some five thousand
experiments in an attempt to improve the storage battery, a friend
condoled him on the great loss of time and expense. Edison's
reply was, "It was amply worth while, for now I know five thousand
things not to do." In like manner, we have learned several things
not to do, for our study of these philosophers warns us that
Representationalism or Copy Theory in whatever guise it appears,
will afford us no thoroughfare.
Locke's statement of the dualism was by Hume's irresistible
logic Drought to a reductio ad absurdum. Reid's transfer of the
copyism from the sensation to the perception, and reduction of
the former to a sort of hair-trigger suggestion fails to save the
theory. Knowledge, then, cannot be a photographic copy of exter-
nality. The only other theory which has been advanced is that it
is instrumental in character. Until some other more conclusive
theory has oeen advanced, this one would seem to indicate the trde
character of perception, especially as it will ce found to be free
from the inconsistencies of the Copy Theory. Let us consider for
a moment Locke's and Reid's insistence on the existence of
external things which were hard or soft, rough or smooth, in motion
or at rest, etc., 'before they were perceived and will continue
to De so when they are not perceived. ' What do hardness, softness,
etc. mean, what can they possibly mean, to a human being except
in terms of human reference? Reid says a thing is hard 'When
the parts adhere so firmly that it cannot easily be made to change
its figure', a definition which is pragmatic enough, as you cannot
tell how readily its parts are displaced unless there is a refer- ,
ence to the human organism in some way, directly or indirectly.
90 %MCl tflOGf'J
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So in spite of himself, his definition of hardness does not show
an absolute independence of a percioient organism. In a sense
somewhat different from that intended by Protagoras, we find that.
"Man is the measure of all things." Thus one lesson which we have
learned from our study is the instrumental character of our know-
ing.
Another 'moral, which the tale discloses' is with regard
to the elemental data of experience which are seen to be not the
bald ideas of sensation and reflection of Locke, or the fleeting,
na^ed, discrete impressions and ideas of Hume» but living, pulsing
throbbing, meaningful experiences. Of course this is just another
way of looking at the same truth disclosed by the statement that
knowledge is instrumental, but as our philosoohers seemed to re-
gard as two distinct facts their belief that the elemental data
are bare sensations, and the belief in their character as copy,
it seems proper to state our outcome in such a way as to show its
opposition to both views. It is only fair to Reid to say that
his eyes were open to the falsity of the first theory specified,
out he held as tenaciously as the rest to the other, and did not
entirely renounce the first, but only modified it sufficiently to
eliminate the most glaring inconsistencies.
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